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Abstract 
This study assesses the evolution of debt sustainability in the Sub Saharan African (SSA) region. 
It also examines the respective contributions of OECD and BRIC to debt sustainability in the 
region. We reveal how the external demand for SSA goods and services from OECD and BRIC 
helps to lower ‘debt-to-exports’ and ‘debt-service-to-exports’ ratios, two of the main gauges of 
debt sustainability. Furthermore, using simple growth accounting, we assess how the net exports 
by SSA to the OECD and BRIC contributes to the region’s GDP growth, and thus indirectly 
helps to lower the ‘debt-to-GDP’ ratio, which is another important measure of indebtedness. 
Our study also compares the ‘actual’ debt levels of SSA with ‘hypothetical’ debt levels that 
simulate the contributions of OECD and BRIC. On the basis of debt sustainability thresholds 
of the joint IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), we test how the 
sustainability of SSA debt has evolved overtime and how much the OECD and BRIC contribute 
to three classes of ‘weak’, ‘medium’ and ‘strong’ debt sustainability targets. 
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1. Introduction  
As noted by the IMF & World Bank (2012), there is a large external financing requirement in 
African countries. Local sources of finance are insufficient to cover the investment gap in 
infrastructure, education and social services. For instance, the present annual spending on 
infrastructure is about US$45 billion, while an estimated 90 to 100 billion USD is needed.  Since 
aid money is limited, developing countries are increasingly looking for alternative channels, 
including non-concessional external borrowing. For instance, external financial flows to Africa 
are estimated to have reached close to 200 billion USD in 2013 (AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015). 
However, given the recent history of debt relief in these countries (Easterly, 2002; Ndikumana, 
2004; Cassimon & Essers, 2013; Cassimon & Verbeke, 2014), non-concessional lending to African 
countries by OECD countries is limited.  
 
Brazil, Russia, India and China (i.e. BRIC) countries represent the largest and most important 
emerging market economies of the world. This group of countries (China in particular) is 
increasingly competing with the OECD countries as major trading partners of African countries 
(De Grauwe, Houssa and Piccillo, 2012).1 Further, they are also serving as a growing source of 
finance - be it aid grants or loans on concessional and non-concessional terms. The loan pledges 
at successive ‘Forum on China Africa Cooperation’ (FOCAC) summits are exemplary of these 
shifts. For instance, USD 5, 10 and 20 billion in loans were announced at the third (2006), fourth 
(2009) and fifth (2012) FOCAC summits, respectively (FOCAC, 2015). However, the growing 
role of financing which is flowing from BRIC to African low income countries (LICs) is rekindling 
‘debt worries’, where years of efforts by OECD creditors, the IMF and World Bank in achieving 
debt sustainability in the region are being undermined (Reisen & Ndoye, 2008).  
 
Given the apparent importance of BRIC and OECD economic blocks to SSA, the basic objective 
of this study is to assess various aspects of external public debt sustainability vis-à-vis Africa’s 
shifting trade engagement with its BRIC and traditional OECD partners. In the analysis, we 
also focus on trade links since some of the core debt sustainability measures are certain ratios of 
debt and exports, e.g. ‘debt-to-exports’ and ‘debt-service-to-exports’ (see section 3). Further, 
given the significant link between exports and GDP cycles in SSA economies (Gurara and Ncube, 
2013; Diallo and Tapsoba, 2014), the trade links with OECD and BRIC could have an effect on 
the ‘debt-to-GDP’ ratio. This latter ratio is in fact the prominently used measure of indebtedness 
as its level signifies whether a country is able to easily service its debt or not. In this regard, we 
first analyze to what extent BRIC and OECD countries are contributing to African exports and 
GDP growth. We then test how much this export and GDP growth contributes to maintaining 
the debt sustainability benchmarks set by the joint IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability 
Framework (DSF).  
 
                                                          
1 This paper uses the same definition and country list as World Bank and IMF in its use of the term ‘OECD’, i.e. 
Organization of Economic Development. This group of countries largely represents the world’s most advanced 
countries that have been SSA’s traditional economic partners. In its current form, the specific list of countries in the 
group includes; Australia, Japan, Austria, Korea Rep., Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Netherlands, 
Czech Republic, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Poland, Finland, Portugal, France, Slovak Republic, 
Germany, Slovenia, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Sweden, Iceland, Switzerland, Ireland, Turkey, Israel, United Kingdom, 
Italy, and United States. 
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The analysis is based on annual bilateral trade data gathered from IMF’s Direction of Trade 
(DOTS) dataset; gross FDI net inflows data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) dataset; bilateral FDI data from UNCTAD; National accounts data from the World 
Bank’s and OECD’s National Accounts datasets; Debt indicators from the World Bank’s 
International Debt Statistics (IDS) and country policy scores from the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database.  
2. Debt evolution and debt sustainability framework  
2.1 Evolution of debt 
Debt rose steeply as a percentage of GDP across SSA countries through the 1970s and 1980s 
before exploding in the early 1990s (Figure 1). It then started its equally steep descent in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, mostly due to grand debt relief schemes such as the HIPC initiative 
(Van Campenhout and Cassimon, 2007; Cassimon and Essers, 2013). 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of external public debt (as % of GDP) by country 
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS database 
 
It is important to note that for many SSA countries a large portion of the external debt owed 
has been to multilateral creditors such as the IMF, the World Bank and African Development 
Bank. As can be seen from Figure 2, multilateral debt constituted more than 50% of overall 
external public debt in almost half of SSA countries in 2013. Further, it accounted for 40% or 
more in nearly two thirds of SSA countries. Generally speaking, the proportions of multilateral 
debt in overall debt are greater in SSA’s poorer economies than in relatively more developed 
countries like South Africa and Mauritius, and resource-rich countries such as Angola, Gabon, 
and the Republic of Congo.  
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Figure 2: Multilateral debt (as % of total external debt) in 2013 
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS database 
2.2 The Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) 
The DSF was introduced in 2005 as a framework enabling the IMF and World Bank to conduct 
external (and public) debt sustainability analysis (DSA) for LICs in a standardized manner (IMF 
& WB, 2012).2 Apart from helping to improve LIC borrowing behavior, the DSF also guides 
various bilateral and multilateral donors-creditors in their grant and loan disbursement 
decisions.3 
 
The DSF compares the external public (and publicly guaranteed debt stocks and service of LICs 
against various thresholds. If debt levels (measured against GDP, exports and revenue) are all 
below the suggested thresholds, then a country’s given level of debt is assumed to be sustainable 
(see Annex 1). However, to address the heterogeneity of developing countries, the framework 
sets different thresholds depending on whether countries have ‘weak’, ‘medium’ or ‘strong’ 
policy scores. The country policy scores used in the DSF come from the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. The LICs that score better on CPIA are 
assigned higher debt sustainability thresholds. The underlying assumption is countries with 
‘strong’ policies and institutions are better placed to withstand macroeconomic shocks compared 
to ‘weaker’ ones (Dabla-Norris and Gunduz, 2014; Megersa and Cassimon, 2015). 
 
Figure 3 indicates that most SSA LICs have relatively low CPIA scores. The majority of 
countries score below the CPIA median of 3.5, falling in the weak (≤3.25) or lower medium (3.25 
to 3.5) CPIA range. This implies low debt sustainability thresholds for most SSA countries. As 
of 2014, Eritrea and South Sudan, for example, have to keep their debts below 30% of GDP and 
100% of exports according to the DSF. Conversely, countries such as Rwanda and Kenya which 
                                                          
2 External debt (also known as foreign debt) represents the gross debt owed to foreign creditors by a country. Public 
debt (alternatively termed as sovereign debt or national debt) signifies the debt owed by national governments. 
3 The DSF uses ‘present value’ (PV) in its analysis of debt sustainability and in setting sustainability targets 
(thresholds). However, empirical studies often use nominal debt figures since adequate long term PV debt data is not 
readily available. This study will also use nominal debt data which is available from the World Bank’s IDS database. 
Yet, the study will borrow the debt sustainability thresholds of the DSF as rough guidelines of sustainability. 
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have - by SSA standards - relatively robust technocratic institutions and high-quality policy may 
accumulate debt up to 50% of GDP and 200% of exports without causing alarms of debt distress.  
 
Figure 3: The distribution of SSA countries by CPIA policy scores (year 2014) 
 
Source: based on World Bank’s CPIA database 
3. Debt sustainability analysis through contributions of OECD & BRIC 
to export and GDP growth  
3.1 The Export Channel 
While examining the contributions of BRIC and OECD to the export growth witnessed in 
African countries, we first split the total exports by African countries on the basis of its 
destination. Specifically, we split gross exports of SSA in to BRIC, OECD and rest of the world 
(ROW).  
 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the OECD countries have been serving as prime destinations of SSA 
exports. Almost 80% of exports (by value) used to go to the OECD up until the beginning of 
the 1990s.  In the meantime, BRIC have risen from well below 5% before the beginning of the 
1990s to assume almost 30% of exports in 2014. The primary player in the club of BRIC (by a 
huge margin) is China, which in 2014 received almost 17% of SSA exports. In the same year, 
India trailed behind China at about 8%. As could be seen from the figure, since 2008 BRIC 
received nearly as much of SSA’s exports as the rest of the world combined, excluding the 
OECD. Based on current trajectories, BRIC might overtake the OECD as the biggest export 
market of SSA countries. For the moment, at least, the OECD countries remain the major export 
market and receive over 40% of SSA’s exports.   
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Figure 4: SSA exports by destinations (% of total) 
 
Source: based on IMF’s DOTS database 
 
Looking at debt to exports ratio (Figures 5 and 6) and debt service to exports ratio (Figures 7 
and 8), the OECD countries appear to have an overwhelming impact on SSA’s debt 
sustainability. This is so since the OECD were by far the largest export destinations for SSA, 
especially until the early 2000s. In recent years, however, BRIC (particularly China and India) 
are catching up fast. Figure 4 clearly shows these reversing trends of SSA’s export destinations. 
Yet, it should be noted that the OECD are still the biggest export destinations, at least for the 
moment. 
 
Figure 5: SSA’s debt to exports ratio (%) together with sustainability thresholds & 
hypothetical scenarios of ‘no export to given destination’   
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS and IMF’s DOTS databases 
 
Figure 6 below delivers similar information to Figure 5. While the former graph is good at giving 
the longer term (1970-2014) evolution of debt to exports ratio, it is difficult to reveal recent 
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trends in the debt sustainability landscape and the relative contributions of OECD and BRIC. 
This is especially made difficult by the very high ‘actual’ and ‘hypothetical’ (i.e. simulated) 
levels of debt to exports in the period between early 1980s to early 2000s. As can be seen in 
Figure 5, the ‘hypothetical’ graph of debt to exports ratio (i.e. the one that excludes exports to 
OECD) spikes to exorbitant levels in the same period. As we noted above, this emanates from 
the duality of high debt levels in SSA and near total export market domination by OECD in 
this period. For instance, the OECD used to receive about 80 % of SSA’s exports up until early 
1990s (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 6: post 2000 trend of debt to exports 
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS and IMF’s DOTS databases 
 
Looking at the recent trends in debt to exports (as shown in Figure 6), we notice that the 
average debt to exports figures for SSA countries have been sustainable since 2004, using the 
‘strong’ debt sustainability threshold. However, given the low policy and institutional rating of 
most SSA countries, the safest threshold would be the one marked as the ‘weak’ debt 
sustainability threshold (see the CPIA ratings of SSA countries in Figure 3). Going by this 
stricter standard, we could say that debt to export figures have been sustainable since 2006. We 
see one interesting exception where debt to export figures spiked briefly and crossed the threshold 
in 2009. This corresponds to the global financial crisis where African exports were severely 
depressed due to recessions in most countries, especially OECD. Looking at the alternative 
hypothetical scenarios of no exports to OECD and BRIC, we still notice that the exclusion of 
OECD to have a bigger detrimental impact towards debt sustainability, when debt is measured 
against export levels. However, even in the short span of the 14 years shown in Figure 6, the 
growing convergence between OECD and BRIC is unmistakably seen. For instance, the exclusion 
of the OECD (unlike BRIC) made debt extremely unsustainable say in 2003, as compared to 
2013.  
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Analysis of debt service to exports 
Looking at the debt service to exports ratio (Figure 7) and the detailed developments in the post 
2000 period (Figure 8), one notices a trend which is similar to the analysis of debt to exports 
which we made above. Starting with the actual debt service to export ratios, we see well over 
25% of export returns servicing debt from about the beginning of the 1980s up to the late 1990s 
(see Figure 7). This makes the debt profiles of SSA countries in that period highly unsustainable. 
Going to our analysis of debt service to exports ratio in the hypothetical scenario of no exports 
to OECD and BRIC, we see that debt service to export ratio would be enormously elevated 
when we exclude exports to OECD, as compared to BRIC. As mentioned in our foregoing 
analysis, this is again explained by the dominance of OECD as SSA’s export market in this 
period. 
 
Figure 7: SSA’s debt service to exports ratio (%) together with sustainability thresholds & 
hypothetical scenarios of ‘no export to given destination’   
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS and IMF’s DOTS databases 
 
Focusing on recent trends of debt service to exports, we see that the relative impact of the 
OECD towards debt sustainability (measured in terms of debt service to export ratio) has been 
rapidly matched by BRIC. However, the OECD countries still make a relatively bigger impact. 
Further, we also notice that, unlike the 1980s and 1990s, debt service to export ratio has largely 
been within ‘sustainable’ threshold bands. In fact, since mid-2000s the debt profile of SSA 
(measured on ‘debt service to exports’) has been exceptionally good that the hypothetical 
exclusion of exports either to OECD or BRIC fails to drive the ratio to unsustainable territories. 
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Figure 8: post 2000 trend of debt service to exports 
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS and IMF’s DOTS databases 
 
3.2 The GDP Channel 
Table 1 gives the estimated contributions of net exports to OECD and BRIC to the GDP growth 
of SSA (refer to Annex 2 concerning the growth accounting used in the analysis).4 The table 
spans the 1970-2014 time period. The second and third columns of the table show the net exports 
to BRIC and OECD, respectively, as a ratio of GDP. It is difficult to compare OECD and BRIC 
on the size of this ratio. The size of the ratio does not necessarily reflect a bigger role for the 
respective trade partner. For instance, in the 1970s and 80s the exports to OECD were very 
large as compared to those of BRIC. However, since the imports from OECD were often equally 
large, the net exports will appear small. Yet, no matter how skewed the trade balance might be, 
the net exports (deficit or surplus) to BRIC had never exceeded the half billion USD mark until 
1998 and the one billion USD mark until 2000. On the other hand, the net export to the OECD 
has been quite high even as far back as the 1970s, especially in the years of significant trade 
surplus or deficit. For instance, in 1974 net exports surplus was nearly 6 billion USD and in 
multiple fiscal years it was in excess of 2 or 3 billion USD. 
 
Further, looking at column 2, we notice that the net exports to BRIC had been predominantly 
negative up until the late 1990s. This shows that SSA economies have been importing more from 
BRIC than exporting to them in this period. Going about by the national income accounting, 
the overall contribution of external demand from BRIC to SSA’s GDP growth will be negative 
in such cases. In the period since the early 2000s, however, the net exports to BRIC have largely 
reversed to positive territories  often making positive contributions to SSA’s growth spurts. 
This largely mirrors the tremendous growth in BRIC in this period and their rising demands for 
                                                          
4 Annex 2 shows how the contributions of net exports to SSA’s GDP growth are computed. 
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commodities to fuel their growth. Among BRIC, China has been the primary driver of global 
commodity demand; from which SSA seem to have benefited significantly.5  
 
Table 1: Contribution of NE to GDP growth, comparing OECD and BRIC 
 
NE/GDP (bill., USD current) NE GROWTH % point contribution of NE (i.e. External Demand) 
to GDP growth 
Calibration t =
(Xt − Mt)
GDPt
 gt =
(t − t−1)
t−1
 
t ∗ g
t 
Trade Partner BRIC OECD BRIC OECD BRIC OECD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1970 0.04 1.00 - - - - 
1971 -0.09 -0.59 -346.01 -159.03 0.31 0.94 
1972 -0.04 0.59 -60.33 -199.29 0.02 -1.17 
1973 -0.12 2.14 249.52 263.21 -0.31 5.63 
1974 -0.23 5.84 83.24 173.00 -0.19 10.10 
1975 -0.28 -0.02 25.92 -100.27 -0.07 0.02 
1976 -0.27 1.10 -4.69 -7045.57 0.01 -77.20 
1977 -0.26 -0.24 -3.84 -122.31 0.01 0.30 
1978 -0.39 -2.68 48.50 995.61 -0.19 -26.66 
1979 -0.27 2.81 -29.32 -205.12 0.08 -5.77 
1980 0.00 0.08 -99.32 -97.15 0.00 -0.08 
1981 -0.29 -1.83 15295.89 -2383.51 -43.66 43.64 
1982 -0.32 -0.25 11.28 -86.47 -0.04 0.21 
1983 -0.22 0.58 -31.15 -335.69 0.07 -1.96 
1984 -0.21 3.65 -2.32 525.67 0.00 19.20 
1985 -0.07 3.59 -67.22 -1.64 0.05 -0.06 
1986 -0.17 0.76 146.20 -78.74 -0.25 -0.60 
1987 -0.18 0.64 2.89 -16.19 -0.01 -0.10 
1988 -0.18 0.71 0.34 10.28 0.00 0.07 
1989 -0.19 1.22 4.26 73.16 -0.01 0.89 
1990 -0.27 1.42 43.37 16.54 -0.12 0.24 
1991 -0.20 -0.28 -23.40 -119.59 0.05 0.33 
1992 -0.35 -0.86 69.42 209.39 -0.24 -1.81 
1993 -0.16 -0.50 -53.05 -42.48 0.09 0.21 
1994 -0.28 0.63 75.29 -226.77 -0.21 -1.43 
1995 -0.23 0.25 -20.08 -60.87 0.05 -0.15 
1996 -0.01 2.40 -96.99 873.60 0.01 20.96 
1997 0.13 2.01 -2036.11 -16.04 -2.69 -0.32 
1998 -0.50 -3.28 -478.29 -262.62 2.39 8.60 
1999 0.32 -1.19 -163.73 -63.78 -0.52 0.76 
2000 1.06 3.20 233.57 -370.04 2.48 -11.86 
2001 0.18 0.79 -82.97 -75.22 -0.15 -0.60 
2002 0.16 0.94 -11.03 18.33 -0.02 0.17 
2003 0.18 1.17 10.45 24.66 0.02 0.29 
2004 -0.31 1.54 -274.66 31.74 0.85 0.49 
2005 -0.54 3.26 73.31 111.09 -0.39 3.62 
2006 0.13 3.85 -124.71 18.11 -0.17 0.70 
2007 -0.12 2.25 -191.50 -41.44 0.23 -0.93 
2008 0.31 4.60 -355.95 104.23 -1.11 4.79 
2009 -0.84 0.17 -370.23 -96.29 3.12 -0.16 
2010 0.54 1.61 -164.24 840.47 -0.89 13.49 
2011 0.29 2.84 -47.08 77.08 -0.13 2.19 
2012 0.42 2.04 47.07 -28.11 0.20 -0.57 
2013 -0.01 0.51 -102.93 -75.07 0.01 -0.38 
2014 -0.78 -0.60 6249.38 -216.99 -48.85 1.29 
Source: based on trade data from IMF’s DOTS database and  
national accounts data from World Bank’s WDI database 
 
On the other hand, the OECD have delivered surplus net exports figure to SSA, more frequently 
than BRIC economies (see column 3 of table 1). Further, unlike BRIC, there is no historical 
reversal of trade balances. Years of negative and positive trade balances appear to follow a 
                                                          
5 Lately, the brisk growth of BRIC is cooling down. This has coincided with the slowing of China, which has been the 
primary engine of global growth and prime consumer of commodities. 
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largely random pattern for the OECD countries (e.g. compare columns 2 and 3). If we factor out 
the fiscal years with extreme net export growths (which often arise from transitions between 
large deficit in one year to surplus in the other, or vice versa) and also consider the absolute 
figures (i.e. ignoring deficit or surplus), we can see that the net exports to OECD historically 
had a much bigger contribution to SSA’s GDP growth (e.g. compare columns 6 and 7). This is 
especially true for the earlier years in our sample where the trade links between SSA and BRIC 
was ‘relatively’ smaller, as compared to the OECD. 
 
Yet, it is rather difficult to see the contribution of external demand to GDP growth in its 
traditional definition as ‘net exports’ (Xing and Pradhananga, 2013). This is so since net exports 
tends to be very erratic as exports (positive) and imports (negative) pull the net figure in 
opposite direction. At best of times, where there is a balanced trade, net exports become zero or 
negligible. Instead, if we solely focus on exports, we would have a much clearer view of the rising 
contribution of BRIC (and the likes of China) as prime destinations for African exports.  
 
Figure 9 shows the contribution of exports (by destination i.e. BRIC, OECD, China) to SSA’s 
GDP growth. There are two interesting stories to read from this graph. First, the bar graphs 
(representing GDP growth) and the line graphs (representing export contribution) are more or 
less synchronized. This shows the extent to which SSA’s GDP growth depends on its 
(commodity) exports to the outside world. The close trend and synchronization between global 
commodity demand (or price) cycles and SSA’s growth cycle has been widely documented in the 
economic literature (Ademola, Bankole, and Adewuyi, 2009; Diallo and Tapsoba, 2014).  
 
Figure 9: Growth decomposition (% point contribution of exports to SSA GDP growth) 
 
Source: based on trade data from IMF’s DOTS & national accounts data from World Bank’s WDI  
 
Second, one observes a clear difference while comparing the three line graphs that represent the 
contribution of exports to OECD for SSA’s GDP growth vis-à-vis BRIC and China. Our 
foregoing analysis is of course comparing OECD and BRIC as a group. However, given the 
preeminent role played by China in recent times, it feels important to place it in the figure just 
for comparison. From Figure 9 we see that exports to OECD, over the whole period, waver far 
away from the horizontal zero line (which signifies zero export contribution to GDP growth). 
This means that increase/decrease in export growth to OECD has played a significant role of 
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increasing/decreasing GDP growth in SSA. By contrast, looking at BRIC, we notice that the 
line graph was nearly flat up until the late 1990s. This implies that exports to BRIC had 
negligible impact on SSA’s growth prospects. Since the early 2000s, however, we witness 
significant boost to GDP growth contributed by exports to BRIC in general, and China in 
particular. The export contributions of OECD and BRIC in this recent (post 2000) period also 
seem to be ‘synchronized’ and nearly ‘balanced’. They are ‘synchronized’ in the sense that the 
graphs representing OECD and BRIC are rising and falling together. For instance, we see an 
upward trend in early 2000s, a downward trend around the 2008/09 global financial crisis period, 
and then a recovery in 2010/11 period and then falling back afterwards again. The export 
contribution of the two economic blocks is also ‘balanced’ or quite comparable in recent years, 
although the OECD still played a slightly bigger role.  
 
The Debt to GDP ratio 
Debt to GDP had been unsustainable in SSA from about early 1980s to mid-2000s using the 
weak and medium debt sustainability thresholds, which characterize most SSA countries (see 
Figure 10). If we use the strong sustainability threshold, we see that debt had not been 
sustainable in the periods spanning late 1980s to early 2000s. This historical pattern mirrors the 
sustainability analysis we conducted above using the measures of debt to exports and debt 
service to exports. However, unlike these two previous exercises, we do not see a similar massive 
change in debt sustainability in the hypothetical scenarios that exclude the export contributions 
of OECD and BRIC. This is partly straight forward since the former debt sustainability measures 
have ‘export’ figures as their denominators. For instance, reducing the value of exports to OECD 
will automatically raise the debt to export ratios and gives a much bigger weight to the 
contribution of OECD to SSA’s debt sustainability. On the other hand, the debt to GDP ratio 
is going to be less affected by export swings as compared to the debt to exports ratio. This is 
easy to assume, given that GDP growth is going to depend on many factors besides exports.6 
That is the reason why we don’t see a big difference (in Figure 10) between the actual debt to 
GDP figure and the hypothetical debt to GDP figures determined by barring the external 
demand from OECD and BRIC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 GDP does not change proportionally to the changes in exports. It will take a simultaneous decline in consumption, 
investment, government expenditure and external demand (net exports) to comparatively skew GDP. Further, the 
fact that we are considering net exports (which theoretically have a zero value in a balanced trade scenario) to 
represent the external demand from either the OECD or BRIC means that there is a smaller deviation as compared 
to an alternative scenario where we might consider only exports. 
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Figure 10: SSA debt to GDP (%) together with sustainability thresholds & hypothetical 
scenario of ‘no trade with given destination’   
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS and IMF’s DOTS databases 
 
Focusing on the recent (post 2000) debt to GDP scenario in Figure 11, we see that debt has 
been sustainable in SSA (measured against GDP) since about 2004, 2005 and 2006 if we use the 
‘strong’, ‘medium’ and ‘weak’ sustainability thresholds, respectively. Further, unlike the debt 
to export and debt service to export measures, there is no considerable rise in debt sustainability 
concerns if international trade links with OECD and BRIC were taken out. In these hypothetical 
scenarios, debt to GDP has still remained tightly alighted to the actual debt to GDP ratio and 
has even remained within the weak sustainability thresholds in the post 2005 period. Even if 
there was the familiar hump in debt to GDP figures coinciding with the 2008/09 recession, the 
figure has still remained sustainable, even when using the most restrictive (weak) sustainability 
threshold. 
 
Figure 11: post 2000 SSA debt to GDP scenario with sustainability thresholds 
 
Source: based on World Bank’s IDS and IMF’s DOTS databases 
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4. Further notes on our debt sustainability exercise 
4.1 On the contribution of FDI to GDP growth 
In our analysis of BRIC and OECD’s contributions to debt sustainability (using the measure of 
debt to GDP ratios), we only consider a hypothetical scenario of ‘no exports’. This is due to 
lack of viable bilateral investment (i.e. FDI) data between respective African countries vis-à-vis 
OECD and BRIC partners. If investment figures were also discounted  just like exports, the 
hypothetical GDP will be even smaller. The impact would be ‘relatively’ bigger in those countries 
that receive larger foreign investment. However, given the fact that foreign direct investment 
figures in SSA are much smaller as compared to other developing regions, its omission would not 
make the results significantly skewed. For instance, according to World Bank’s WDI dataset 
(see Figure 12), FDI as share of GDP still trails way below 5% of GDP in the SSA region. Even 
if nominal FDI figures are rising in recently years, their relative contribution to SSA’s GDP is 
minor. The region’s robust growth since early 2000s is largely driven by the service and 
agricultural sectors (McMillan and Harttgen, 2014). The recent rapid GDP growth rates, relative 
to unimpressive FDI growth, still yields low share of GDP for FDI in SSA. 
 
Figure 12: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
 
Source: based on FDI data from World Bank’s WDI database 
 
4.2 On the contribution of exports to GDP growth  
As Lin and Li (2002) argue, the basic national income identity based analysis is going to 
underestimate the effect of exports on GDP growth because increases on exports can also have 
an effect on consumption, investment and imports. To remark this reality, we run regressions of 
consumption, investment and imports vis-à-vis exports. Since we basically want to show the 
trade elasticities for SSA countries, we use a simple bivariate model of the following form; 
 , i=1 ...n and t=1 ...T                                                      (1) 
Where,   
Z it = [C it, I it, M it]  
C it = Consumption of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
 I it = Investment of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
M it = Imports of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
X it = Gross value of exports by country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
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The above model is estimated via pooled least squares (PLS) and Fixed Effects (FE) models, 
where the latter regressions are intended to control for country heterogeneity within the sample. 
The dataset is an unbalanced panel of 45 SSA countries over the 1960-2014 period.7 As we can 
see from Table 2, the coefficients of exports in the three bivariate models (i.e. the elasticities of 
consumption, investment and imports with respect to exports) are all significant. This goes to 
show that a boost in SSA exports to OECD, BRIC or elsewhere in the world would augment 
not only imports but also consumption and investment figures. Therefore, the overall effect of 
exports on the economic growth would be larger in reality than what the simple national income 
accounting identity would tell us. This would specially be the case if the indirect positive impacts 
(of export growth) reflected in consumption and investment growth outweigh import growth. 
The implication of this being, rising exports to OECD and BRIC would play a vital role towards 
the dual policy targets of economic growth and debt sustainability in SSA economies. 
 
Table 2: Regressing consumption, investment and imports on exports 
 PLS FE PLS FE PLS FE 
 Consumption  Consumption  Investment Investment Imports Imports 
Country Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Exports 0.715***    0.612***    0.909***    0.945***    0.852***    0.922***    
 (0.015)     (0.014) (0.008)    (0.010) (0.005)    (0.006) 
       
Constant 7.796***    9.946***     1.587***    0.857***    3.358***     1.948***    
 (0.326)     (0.298) (0.165)      (0.201) (0.104)     (0.123) 
        
R2 0.699 0.699 0.865 0.865 0.929 0.929 
N 923 923 1933 1933 2100 2100 
F(1, N)  2134.59 1864.32 12368.22 8934.82 27451.15 22894.72 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
4.3 Complexity of bilateral relation between SSA vis-à-vis OECD and BRIC 
Our foregoing analysis doesn’t capture the whole (complex) picture of SSA’s relationship with 
OECD, BRIC and the rest of the world on trade, investment and aid flows. Namely, the inclusion 
of FDI, aid flows and bilateral debt would add an interesting and pragmatic dimension to the 
analysis.8 We would also like to remark that this leaves an interesting area of inquiry for future 
research. Yet, we try to reflect more on the complexity of SSA’s bilateral relations with its 
economic partners and the impact this has on debt sustainability by particularly focusing on 
China, given its massive (though less transparent) presence in the SSA region. Even if neither 
the FDI data taken from UNCTAD (which is by itself taken from China’s Ministry of Commerce) 
                                                          
7 The list of countries included in the panel regressions are: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
8 Given the limitations of accessing continuous (and reliable) bilateral time series data, the above exercise did not 
include these dimensions in the basic debt sustainability analysis given in section 3. 
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nor the aid flows and bilateral debt data taken from ‘AidData’ are fully accurate, they give some 
glimpse in to the trends in Chinese bilateral engagements in SSA.9 
4.3.1 FDI trends (Chinese case) 
In recent years, China’s investment in SSA has rapidly grown. For instance, over the decade 
spanning 2003 to 2012, Chinese FDI in to SSA has jumped from about 70 million USD to over 
2.5 billion USD (see Table 3). Some of the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese FDI in the region 
include South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia and D.R. Congo. In the same period, Chinese global FDI 
footprint increased from about 2.85 billion to 87.80 billion USD. Another interesting observation 
of Chinese FDI has been the fact that much of it goes to other developing countries. Historically, 
China has benefited from the FDI that it received from advanced economies. China, in its own 
right, is now a large investor in other developing countries. For instance in 2012, Chinese FDI 
to developing countries amounted to about 70 billion USD while the same figure for advanced 
economies was about 13.5 billion. 
 
Table 3:  China’s FDI outflow by destination (Mill. USD) 
Region / economy 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
World 2854.65 5497.99 12261.17 17633.97 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 74654.04 87803.53 
Developed economies 211.44 335.51 730.68 519.51 2747.36 2787.17 7042.83 10863.95 13422.57 13508.35 
Developing economies 2604.61 5065.24 11215.6 16564.98 22891.16 52054.8 48779.79 56735.91 60033.51 70016.64 
Africa 74.81 317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31 5490.56 1438.87 2111.99 3173.14 2516.66 
North Africa 4.86 165.71 190.41 153.57 280.86 11.1 358.49 259.57 1153.45 365.12 
SS Africa 69.95 151.72 201.27 366.29 1293.45 5479.46 1080.38 1852.42 2019.69 2151.54 
Angola 0 0 0 22.39 41.19 -9.57 8.31 101.11 72.72 392.08 
Botswana 0.8 0 3.69 2.76 1.87 14.06 18.44 43.85 21.86 21.1 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0.73 2.05 1.69 0.82 14.88 1.87 17.65 
Congo 0 0.51 8.11 13.24 2.5 9.79 28.07 34.38 6.81 98.8 
Congo, Democratic Rep. of 0 11.91 5.07 36.73 57.27 23.99 227.16 236.19 75.18 344.17 
Côte d’ Ivoire 0.62 6.75 8.74 -2.91 1.74 -7.02 1.51 -5.02 0.87 3.61 
Equatorial Guinea 0 1.69 6.35 10.19 12.82 -4.86 20.88 22.08 12.47 138.84 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 -0.49 0 2.94 3.3 1.96 
Ethiopia 0.98 0 4.93 23.95 13.28 9.71 74.29 58.53 72.3 121.56 
Gabon 0 5.6 2.08 5.53 3.31 32.05 11.88 23.44 1.93 30.69 
Ghana 2.89 0 2.57 0.5 1.85 10.99 49.35 55.98 40.07 208.49 
Guinea 1.2 14.44 16.34 0.75 13.2 8.32 26.98 9.74 24.55 64.44 
Kenya 0.74 2.68 2.05 0 8.9 23.23 28.12 101.22 68.17 78.73 
Liberia 0 0.58 8.65 -7.03 0 2.56 1.12 29.89 21.09 12 
Madagascar 0.68 13.64 0 1.17 13.24 61.16 42.56 33.58 23.1 8.43 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 5.44 0 9.86 1.2 10.33 
Mali 5.41 0 0 2.6 6.72 -1.28 7.99 3.05 47.58 44.42 
Mauritania 1.7 0 0 4.78 -4.98 -0.65 6.53 5.77 19.69 30.87 
Mauritius 10.27 0 2.04 16.59 15.58 34.44 14.12 22.01 419.46 57.83 
Mozambique 0 0.66 2.88 0 10.03 5.85 15.85 0 20.26 230.52 
Namibia 0.62 0 0 0.85 0.91 7.59 11.62 5.51 5.04 25.12 
Niger 0 1.53 5.76 7.94 100.83 0 39.87 196.25 51.63 -195.94 
Nigeria 24.4 45.52 53.3 67.79 390.35 162.56 171.86 184.89 197.42 333.05 
Rwanda 0 0 1.42 2.99 0 12.88 8.62 12.72 9.69 5.02 
Senegal 0.65 0 0 0 0 3.6 11.04 18.96 0 4.47 
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.28 4.34 53.4 
Sierra Leone 0 5.92 0.49 3.71 2.85 11.42 0.9 0 10.75 7.69 
South Africa 8.86 17.81 47.47 40.74 454.41 4807.86 41.59 411.17 -14.17 -814.91 
Togo 0 1.85 0 4.58 2.7 4.2 8.91 11.77 9.04 20.59 
Uganda 1 0 0 0 4.01 -6.7 1.29 26.5 9.91 9.79 
United Rep. of Tanzania 0 1.62 0.96 12.54 -3.82 18.22 21.58 25.72 53.12 119.7 
Zambia 5.53 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.8 75.05 291.78 291.55 
Zimbabwe 0 0.71 1.47 3.42 12.57 -0.72 11.24 33.8 440.03 287.47 
Source:  UNCTAD FDI/TNC database, based on data from P.R. China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).10 
 
 
                                                          
9 On bilateral data such as aid flows, Brautigam (2010) documents the difficulty of getting data from major emerging 
economies (e.g. Russia, China, India, and Brazil). 
10 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Transnational Corporations (TNC) 
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Even if we only showed Chinese FDI data above - as an example, the overall conclusion is that 
other BRIC (or OECD countries for that matter) play a useful role in boosting SSA’s GDP 
growth via the investment channel.  
4.3.2 Aid flows (Chinese case) 
According to ‘AidData’, Chinese aid to Africa has risen from about a billion dollars at the turn 
of the century to over nine billion by 2012. Even if it is difficult to check the accuracy of these 
figures, what is evident is that there has been a remarkable ascent in Chinese aid flows (see 
Strage et al., 2013 for transparency problems of Chinese data). As can be seen from Figure 13, 
a simple comparison of Chinese aid flows in to specific SSA countries between years 2000 and 
2012 would give a little clue. Some of the biggest beneficiaries (which received over a billion 
dollars in 2012 according to ‘AidData’) include; Congo Rep., Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Once again, the conclusion out of this is that, aid flows (be it from emerging donors such as 
China or the traditional donors of the OECD group) play a role in boosting SSA’s GDP growth. 
However, the literature of course documents some controversies regarding the empirical 
foundations of this argument. Some studies, such as Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Brautigam 
and Knack (2004), have shown that aid has in fact played a negative role in growth. This stands 
in contradiction with the traditional view of aid as a positive deriver of growth in the developing 
world (Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp, 2004).  Whatever the final verdict 
of this debate may be, it goes to show the complexity of the bilateral ties between SSA vis-à-vis 
OECD and BRIC. 
 
Figure 13: Chinese aid (official development finance) flows to African countries (mill. USD) 
 
Source: based on ‘AidData’ database (http://china.aiddata.org) 
 
4.3.3 Bilateral debt (Chinese case) 
Another essential element of the foregoing discussion should be bilateral debt. However, given 
the lack of continuous and reliable data, it has not been explicitly included in the analysis in 
section 3. Yet, it is important to show the trend especially with regard to the big emerging 
sources of finance, particularly China. Strange et al. (2013) use a novel technique to gather 
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information on the list of major Chinese deals in African countries and their amounts.11  As the 
following excerpt (Table 4 below) shows, China has been pledging millions and billions of dollars 
for various mega projects in SSA. The channel of financing, the type of projects involved and 
the total sums budgeted varies greatly. Nonetheless, what is unmistakable is China’s increasing 
role in funding big African infrastructure projects. 
 
Table 4: Chinese bilateral loans, grants, export credits and debt forgiveness given to 
African Countries (in millions of US$) 
Year Recipient Project Flow Value 
2000 Africa, regional $1 billion of African debt cancelled; may not 
be bilateral 
Debt 
forgiveness 
1697 
2003 Cameroon Memve’ele Dam Loan 674 
2003 Sudan Construction of the Merowe hydroelectric 
dam 
Loan 836 
2004 Angola Phase 1 of National Rehabilitation Project Loan 1507 
2004 Zimbabwe ZESA Secures Funding for Lake Kariba 
Power Plant 
Loan 1010 
2006 Equatorial Guinea $2b oil-backed loan Loan 2692 
2006 Mauritania $3 Billion Loan for oil exploration, sewage 
systems, iron mine, road 
Loan 4037 
2006 Nigeria Infrastructure in exchange for preferential oil 
right bidding 
Vague 5383 
2006 Nigeria Light Rail Network Loan 673 
2007 Sudan Construction of railway from Khartoum to 
Port Sudan 
Export credits 1377 
2008 Madagascar Construction of hydroelectric plant Loan 1421 
2009 Angola Agricultural development Loan 1200 
2009 Cameroon Loan for water distribution project Loan 775 
2009 Ethiopia Concessional Ex-Im Bank Loan for Dam 
Construction 
Loan 2249 
2009 Ghana $3B USD loan from China Development 
Bank for oil project, road project,others 
Loan 3000 
2009 Mauritius East-West Corridor, Ring Road, Bus Way, 
and Harbour Bridge 
Loan 782 
2009 Mozambique China builds Agricultural Research 
Center/Agriculture Station 
In-kind Grant 700 
2010 Ghana China grants $6b concessionary loan Loan 5485 
2010 Zambia Chinese firm to build Kafue Gorge power 
plant (2010 commitment) 
Loan 930 
2011 South Africa Financial Cooperation Agreement Loan 2072 
Source: Strange et al. (2013; Page 33) 
 
However, as we have shown before (Figures 2) bilateral debt is still a smaller component of 
overall debt in most SSA countries, particularly the less developed ones that cannot borrow on 
                                                          
11 Given the difficulty of acquiring official figures on Chinese aid flows, researchers at AidData use an innovative 
technique to gather data. Specifically, they used ‘media-based data collection (MBDC)’ methods to track project-
level Chinese development finance. They explain how MBDC can be used to work around bilateral and multilateral 
development organizations that do not share data (Strange et al., 2013). 
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non-concessional terms. 12  Most SSA countries still primarily depend on concessional (and 
multilateral) sources of debt to finance their numerous development projects.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we undertake a basic and alternative debt sustainability exercise in SSA economies. 
In doing so, we try to address various issues surrounding the debt notion. First, we analyze the 
historical and recent trends of debt sustainability in SSA economies. In this regard, we try to 
examine the evolution of debt over a period spanning more than four decades. The results of 
this exercise shows that, first debt levels across countries of SSA region has risen from ‘relatively’ 
low levels to highly unsustainable magnitudes from about late 1980s to early 2000s, where the 
peak levels have been reached for most countries in the 1990s. This basically conforms to the 
evidence presented in the contemporary debt literature.  
 
Additionally, our exercise borrows the debt sustainability thresholds used in the joint IMF-
World Bank DSF analysis.13 We compare these ‘desired’ debt thresholds to (i) the ‘actual’ debt 
ratios and (ii) our own ‘hypothetical’ debt ratios which represent the contributions of OECD 
and BRIC. The hypothetical debt ratios are ‘what would have materialized’ if the contributions 
(e.g. external demand) by the two partner economic blocks were assumed to be absent. We can 
think of this as a sort of ‘stress test’ (i.e. major shock) on the debt sustainability scenario. Surely, 
this will lead to elevated debt ratios, relative to exports and GDP. What is of interest to this 
paper is, by how much the ‘hypothetical’ scenarios would elevate the debt ratios of SSA. While 
answering this, it is more sensible to focus on the post 2000 period. This becomes apparent, 
given the fact that ‘actual’ debt levels were already unsustainable for the SSA region in the 
decades before. The results show that the two export based measures of debt sustainability, 
namely debt to exports and debt service to exports, would be highly susceptible while debt to 
GDP much less so. This result is also evident since ‘export’ is explicitly stated as the 
denominator of the former two debt measures. Yet, it is interesting to see that in recent years 
(especially in the post global financial crisis period), SSA region’s debt profile seems rather 
sustainable and resilient to the ‘hypothetical’ export shocks from OECD and BRIC. This stands 
in stark contrast to the historical evidence, where debt was mostly unsustainable. 
 
We also compare the historical contributions to debt sustainability by OECD and BRIC  with 
one another. The objective of this is to determine the relative importance of OECD and BRIC 
for SSA’s debt sustainability. We also assess how the roles of the two major economic blocks 
(i.e. OECD or BRIC) have evolved overtime. This has been an interesting exercise since it has 
revealed the rapid rise of BRIC (particularly China) in their role as a major export market of 
SSA economies and how this fits in to the ‘indirect’ role of fulfilling debt sustainability in SSA 
economies (e.g. by depressing debt to exports ratios). Particularly, the analysis of recent trends 
                                                          
12 At the core of the discussion about what levels of ‘debt-to-GDP’ are sustainable for countries at different levels of 
economic development is also a debate about the complex link between the nominator (debt) and the denominator’s 
growth (i.e. GDP or economic growth). In this regard, there is a rich and ongoing discussion as can be seen from 
Panizza and Presbitero (2013; 2014), Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), Megersa (2015), Megersa and Cassimon (2015). 
13 The DSF is the current formal debt sustainability framework used not only by the IMF and WB, but also by 
governments and policy makers of developing countries and various multilateral institutions (see Section 2.2). 
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(i.e. post 2000 period) has shown that BRIC have done a phenomenal role of catching up with 
their OECD cohorts. However, our exercise has also uncovered the overwhelming historical role 
of the OECD countries in this regard.  
 
In addition, we also try to reflect up on the complex and multifaceted bilateral interaction 
between SSA economies and their OECD and BRIC partners by focusing on FDI, aid flows and 
bilateral loans. The additional analysis complements the basic empirical exercise - which omits 
these areas of bilateral relations due to data constraints and methodological intricacy. In 
analyzing these latter aspects, we particularly focus on China since it delivers an interesting 
example in to the rapidly evolving bilateral relations between SSA and the outside world. Our 
analysis shows that new actors such as China (just like the traditional OECD partners) are 
having significant involvement with SSA economies. This also has a clear positive trend where 
the flow of foreign ‘development’ funds via FDI, aid and loan packages appears to be accelerating 
over the years.  The overall implication of this is that SSA’s development partners play a bigger 
role to the region’s growth prospects, i.e. much more than what their contribution as trade 
partners would suggest. This, ultimately, makes them crucial to the region’s dual long term 
objectives of balancing economic growth with debt sustainability. 
Annex 1 
Contribution to debt sustainability (OECD Vs. BRIC) 
We examine the Contribution of OECD and BRIC to debt sustainability in African countries via exports 
as follows. Suppose Debt it represents the debt owed by country ‘i’ at time ‘t’, Export it = Gross value of 
exports by country ‘i’ at year ‘t’, Export BRIC it = Value of exports to BRIC by country ‘i’ at year ‘t’, and 
Export OECD it = Value of exports to OECD by country ‘i’ at year ‘t’; we could represent the debt to 
exports ratio in the ‘hypothetical scenario’ of no exports to OECD as (in %); 
 
                                                                                              (2) 
 
We could then assess the contribution of OECD countries to the debt sustainability of African countries 
(via export channel) by comparing the above hypothetical ratio (equation 2) with the actual debt to 
exports ratio. In a similar fashion to equation 2, we capture the debt to exports ratio in the ‘hypothetical 
scenario’ of no exports to BRIC. We also examine the hypothesis that the relative contribution of the 
OECD (via the export channel) to African countries’ debt sustainability is higher than that of BRIC. We 
approach this as; 
 
>                                             (3) 
 
This would mean that the OECD countries play a bigger role to debt sustainability measured against 
exports (at year’t’). However, we will also look at the historical evolution of the contribution of BRIC 
and OECD to debt sustainability on the above measure. This is important to do since there is a 
presumption that BRIC are playing an increasing role as compared to OECD.  
 
We also analyze if the contributions of BRIC and OECD to debt sustainability enables SSA countries to 
meet the specific debt sustainability requirements of the DSF. We will do so by testing whether the DSF 
debt targets (thresholds) are still met in the ‘hypothetical’ absence of exports to BRIC or OECD. Given 
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the heterogeneity of developing countries on the bases of policy strength and institutional qualities (Figure 
3 in section 2.2), the DSF sets three categories of debt sustainability thresholds for debt-to-exports14; 
 
                                (4) 
 
The assessment we make can be stated as; 
 
> and/or > (5)                                    
 
That is, we argue that in the absence of export links to OECD or BRIC, country ‘i’ will not achieve the 
DSF targets since this will lead to high debt to exports ratios. We will also conduct an analysis for ‘debt 
service to exports’ and ‘debt to GDP’ ratios in a similar fashion to the analysis we make for the debt-to-
exports ratio above (steps 2 to 5 above). Within the framework of the GDP channel, we examine the 
Contribution of BRIC and OECD to debt sustainability in SSA countries via GDP growth as indicated 
in Annex 2. However, we use different thresholds for ‘debt to GDP’ ratio for the three categories of 
policy/institutional qualities in SSA economies. The debt-to-GDP sustainability thresholds (as in IMF-
WB DSF) are given as;  
 
                 (6) 
 
In the absence of trade and investment links to OECD or BRIC, we hypothesize that country ‘i’ will not 
achieve the DSF targets since this will increase the debt to GDP ratio  by depressing its GDP. 
Annex 2 
Determining the contribution of OECD and BRIC to SSA’s GDP growth 
Our estimation of the contribution of export growth to GDP growth is based on the basic national accounts 
identity, namely: 
Y it = C it +I it +G it +(X it -M it), i=1 ...k and t=1 ...n                                                                             (7) 
Where, 
Y it = National income of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
C it = Consumption of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
 I it = Investment of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
G it = Government Expenditure of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
X it = Exports of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
M it = Imports of country ‘i’ at year ‘t’ 
 
If we differentiate the above equation with respect to time (t), we will get the following expression: 
 
                                                                                                        (8) 
Where,   and so on for the other terms. 
                                                          
14 See IMF and World Bank (2012) for the debts sustainability thresholds within the DSF analysis. 
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If we represent the net exports part of the right hand side equation (i.e. ) with , we may 
present the above equation as: 
,  i=1 ...k and t=1 ...n                                                                                (9) 
 
For further analysis, we may again rewrite the above left and right hand side terms as follows:  
,  i=1 ...k and t=1 ...n                                                                  (10) 
 
In this setting, the ratios and represent the shares of national income accounted by 
consumption, investment, government expenditure and net exports; while the ratios   and 
  represent the growth rates of the respective variables.  
 
The four right hand side additives of Equation (10) represent by how much GDP would grow following a 
growth in any of these parts. For instance, or  represents the growth in GDP as a result 
of a corresponding growth in net-exports while or represents the GDP growth attributable to 
growth in gross export value of goods and services. 
 
By splitting net exports by its destination in to BRIC, OECD and the rest of the world (ROW), we can 
make comparisons about the relative importance of these trade partners to SSA countries’ GDP growth. 
That is:   
 , i=1 ...k and t=1 ...n                                                        (11) 
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